This article traces the social and cultural significance of the Korean War in contemporary British society, from the initial involvement of British military forces in July 1950 to the unveiling of the first London memorial dedicated to the conflict in December 2014. In particular it explores why the Korean War has been labelled the 'forgotten war' of the twentieth century. After an initial surge of concern over the prospect of another world war in the summer of 1950, the Korean War was largely viewed as a distant war on a little-known peninsula and was continually obscured by the memory of the Second World War. Korea continued to be excluded from British national identity and memorial culture into the twentieth century as, unlike the Second World War, it served no purpose to subsequent generations. Moreover, the mantle of the 'forgotten war' had a discernible impact on how British veterans of Korea wrote about their experiences and understood their identity as post-1945 servicemen.
arguments of James Hinton, Geoff Eley and Richard Vinen, this article argues that the Korean War was eclipsed even at the time by the memory of the 1939-1945 conflict. 6 The British population, after an initial rush of fear in the summer of 1950 (partially concerned with the potential use of atomic weapons) became largely ambivalent towards the distant war in Korea. The ambiguous war aims of the Korean War, its distance from the UK and its unsatisfactory conclusion similarly contributed to its 'forgotten' status. Although many servicemen tried to evoke Second World War ideas of duty, being an 'underdog'
and protecting the world from tyranny, the Korean War never came close to it in the national imagination. Neither did it provoke the level of opposition that was later seen against the Vietnam War:
although the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), elements of the Trade Union movement and many left-wing intellectuals opposed the conflict, it never inspired the same levels of mass opposition, on either side of the Atlantic.
Korea continued to be excluded from British national identity and memorial culture later in the twentieth century as, unlike the Second World War, it served no use to subsequent generations. Aside 7 M*A*S*H was a long-running television programme (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) , based on a 1969 film of the same name and followed exploits of a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (US Army) in Korea; Basil Fawlty was the title character of the BBC television series Fawlty Towers (1975 Towers ( -1979 charges in 1951 (to cover the costs of rearmament). 9 Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan famously resigned in opposition. 10 Yet these fleeting, almost clichéd, references show we have tended to regard the Korean War as an ill-fitting part of the history of the welfare state, rather than analysing it as part of the complex legacy of the Second World War, the emerging anxieties associated with the Cold War and the end of empire. As a result it has sank into relative cultural obscurity during the second half of the twentieth century.
However, Korea's status as a forgotten war has had an enduring impact on those who served But given the complex meaning of forgetting, is its use in history-writing always justified? The
Korean War was not the first, or indeed, the last war to be described as forgotten, not least because it has proven to be a successful publishing strategy (Arthur's first book was a The Second World War continued to exert a powerful grasp over national memory for the remainder of the century. By contrast, the Korean War could not be used to support this notion of national identity
Rather than an 'underdog' triumphing over unquestionable 'evil', Britain had been a junior partner in a conflict whose aims, methods and outcomes had been at best unclear, at worst criticized.
The Korean War in British Social History
Before examining how Korea was excluded from national memory, it is important to understand the specific circumstances of the war itself, which ultimately contributed to its forgotten status. Korea. An estimated 40,000 British servicemen (with an additional 60,000 from the wider Commonwealth) served in Korea and up to 50 per cent of some units were composed of National Servicemen, men aged between eighteen and twenty-one and conscripted for eighteen months (extended to two years in October 1950). 41 They were dubbed by some MPs as 'citizens in uniform', but deemed 'costly and inefficient' by others. 42 The National Servicemen were joined by recalled reservists from the Second World War and a small number of 'K-Force' volunteers from across the Commonwealth.
Britain's junior role in decision-making in Korea, to some extent contributed to its forgotten status:
critics in particular pointed out that Britain was subject to the decisions of the US and to the UN. 61 It was stated that the war had not been planned, but that it was necessary for the protection of democracy. ... We're the stooges of America.' References to the atom bomb were frequent, but many dismissed its threat arguing that it will never be used. Furthermore, once it became clear that nuclear war was not going to be unleashed, much of the concern dissipated. Although no comparable MO data exists any later than autumn 1950, Kynaston has noted that news of the Korean War was even eclipsed by August with the birth of Princess Anne. 71 After an initial period of fear, there were fewer references to Korea in national newspapers and the Houses of Parliament: even in July 1950, the MO surveys stated that there was no increase in newspaper sales (as typically happened in wartime). 72 One veteran later stated that even in 1952, he was already 'beginning to feel like a forgotten soldier from a forgotten war.' 73 In the same year Christine Knowles, founder of a fund for British prisoners of war which had been running since 1918, proclaimed angrily in a newspaper interview that she had '"never known times when men were fighting when so little has been done for them by the people at home"'. continuing duty. In a news response survey of July 1950, the majority of respondents felt that it was 'right' that the US was involved in Korea, even if they feared the consequences. 79 One respondent even noted that 'they are not doing any more than we are doing in Malaya or Greece.' This argument is corroborated by Kynaston, who cites a 1950 Gallup poll which found that 78 per cent of respondents supported increased defence expenditure. 80 The British serviceman still represented the maintenance of international law and the British 'common will to order'. In this way, the Korean War was no different from what had come before: it merely substantiated, rather than changed, widely-held views about
Britain's military duties and capabilities. 
Forgetting Korea
There were several key stages in this process. Neither, as the years went by, did the Korean War speak to contemporary trends or conflicts.
Even during the early 1960s, Korea was being regarded as the prelude to Vietnam, the latter conflict becoming steadily more unpopular during the early 1970s. 99 excepting those who will proudly proclaim, "I was there, that was my war".' 102 The Falklands War made Korea's omission even more stark to its veterans, who had by that time began to reflect on their experiences and found a British public seemingly disinterested in the cause for which they had fought.
Writing the Forgotten War: Veteran Life-Writing
For the servicemen who fought in Korea, however, the war was not easy to forget. Derek Halley wrote in his memoir:
I remember the forgotten war. Disraeli was wrong: if time were the 'great physician' I would have forgotten long ago. But who was he, anyway? Just another politician who never presumptive warriors, generals, experts and television presenters' used familiar ideas to 'signify' the event of the war. This meant that the conflict in the Gulf had 'been anticipated in all its details and exhausted by all the scenarios'. 108 The memory of the Second World War on the Korean War generation meant that every action of theirs had also been anticipated, and it was thus overlooked, its unique characteristics forgotten. In this way, the Korean War 'never happened'. But the conflict has yet to occupy a dominant position in national memorial culture and, as this article has shown in tracing the genealogy of the Korean War in British society and culture, forgetting
